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Abstract 
With the benefit of hindsight, and in light of the current crisis, a growing 
number of authors have concluded that Zanu (PF) and Robert Mugabe’s 
relationship with socialism was never more than a cynical slogan employed to 
mobilise the masses. By contrast, this paper will argue that such interpretations 
are mistaken. Indeed, an examination of Zanu (PF)’s welfare initiatives in the 
period 1980-1985 uncovers ‘episodes of ambiguity’ pointing towards a possible 
socialist future. Yet as this paper also acknowledges, these moments coexisted 
with and were soon superseded by authoritarian alternatives. The particular 
nature of Zimbabwe in this period has been much debated. Both at the time and 
subsequently, many observers questioned why the country had failed to 
experience the socialist transformation that Zanu (PF) once promised, given the 
fact that in the early 1980s the government was implementing a type of 
socialism that was loosely constructed around welfare provisions. This paper 
revisits the early 1980s when Zanu (PF) to some extent engaged with socialism 
on more than a rhetorical level; when a socialist future seemed possible. 
 
Introduction 
As the current crisis in Zimbabwe shows few signs of abating, there is a 
tendency in journalistic and popular accounts to write the country off from the 
moment Mugabe came to power.2 In doing so, there is a danger of losing sight 
of the brave new dawn heralded by Independence in 1980. This paper revisits a 
moment, however constrained and fleeting, in the early 1980s when a transition 
to socialism seemed possible. By 1979, Zanu (PF) led by Robert Mugabe 
emerged as the dominant liberation movement within the country, and stressed 
that the ‘Second Chimurenga’, Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, was 
ideologically ‘based on scientific socialism’.3 Additionally, there was the 
widely held belief that once independence had been achieved, “lateral 
communication”,4 that is, dialogue with the masses, would shape governmental 
policies. When this commitment was questioned, Ministers were quick to 
                                               
1
 The author wishes to thank Ian Phimister and Daryl Gowlett for their valuable comments on 
earlier drafts. 
2
 For an example of this literature see David Blair, Degrees in Violence - Robert Mugabe and 
the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe (London: Continuum, 2003); Martin Meredith, Our 
Votes Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs, 
2003); and Heidi Holland, Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who 
Became a Tyrant (London: Allen Lane, 2008). 
3
 Zanu (PF), Official Press Release issued by the Central Committee (Chimoi: Zanu (PF), 
August 1979).  
4
 Zanu (PF), Official Press Release issued by the Central Committee (Chimoi: Zanu (PF), 
August 1979). 
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reassure the masses that socialism, loosely constructed as social welfare 
provisions, was not just a rhetorical device used in the context of wartime 
propaganda. While the march towards socialism would be a gradual process, 
Zanu (PF) was indeed committed to a socialist future.  
 
In the event, this commitment never materialised and by about 1985 it was 
clear that whatever Zanu (PF)’s relationship with socialism might once have 
been, it was giving way to the strictures of structural adjustment, formally 
adopted in 1990. With the benefit of hindsight, and in light of the current crisis, 
a growing number of authors have concluded that Zanu (PF) and Robert 
Mugabe’s relationship with socialism was never more than a cynical slogan 
employed to mobilise the masses. By contrast, this paper will argue that such 
interpretations are mistaken. In doing so, it will re-visit those scholars, 
prominent amongst whom is Christine Sylvester, who recognised that in this 
period, Zimbabwe was “somewhere in between socialist and capitalist 
parameters”.5 Indeed, examination of Zanu (PF)’s welfare initiatives in the 
period 1980-1985 uncovers ‘episodes of ambiguity’; ambiguous in as much as 
they opened up possibilities which pointed towards a possible socialist future, 
after the so-called ‘national democratic’ phase.6 As the then Minister of 
Labour, Kumbirai Kangai puts it, “the goals we were fighting for have not been 
abandoned… We believe we are going through a national democratic 
revolution whereby the institutions, the society have to be democratised. This is 
a national democratic phase but it is also a transition to socialism”.7 Yet as this 
paper also acknowledges, these moments coexisted with and were soon 
superceded by authoritarian alternatives.8  
 
According to David Moore, “much debate on the nature of Zimbabwean 
politics and ideology has focused on whether or not the ‘revolution failed’, and 
whether or not the petit-bourgeois leaders of the struggle for national liberation 
had the intention or were capable of transforming that battle into a socialist 
one”.9 Consequently the particular nature of Zimbabwe in this period has been 
much debated, with many observers questioning why the country had failed to 
experience the socialist transformation that Zanu (PF) once promised. 
                                               
5
 Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1991), 183. 
6
 For further clarification of the use of the term ‘ambiguity’ in this context, see Robert Davies, 
“The Transition to Socialism in Zimbabwe: Some Areas for Debate.” In Colin Stoneman, ed., 
Zimbabwe’s Prospects: Issues of Race, Class and Capital in Southern Africa (London: 
Macmillan, 1988), 18-32.  
7
 The Ministry of Education and Culture, “Education: the road to Zimbabwe’s future,” The 
Herald, 1 May 1982: 12.   
8
 This article does not aim to assess the nature of Zimbabwe from independence to the present 
day, nor offer a defence of the actions of Robert Mugabe and Zanu (PF). Rather it aims to 
challenge a deterministic and Whiggish interpretation of Zimbabwe’s history.  
9
 David B. Moore, “The ideological formation of the Zimbabwean Ruling Class,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 17 (1991): 472. 
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Accordingly, this article will firstly discuss the historiography of the early 
independence years, and secondly examine Zanu (PF)’s initial reforms in 
education, healthcare and labour. In doing so, it will suggest that initially the 
Party did follow a socialist agenda. The emerging authoritarian nature of the 
regime, as well as factors which may have mitigated against further socialist 
transformations will also be examined. The conclusion argues that by 1985 or 
so, elements within Zanu (PF) were becoming increasingly divorced from the 
socialist positions they had adopted towards the close of the liberation struggle.  
 
The literature concerning Zimbabwe in the period 1980 to 1985 is characterised 
by two dominant positions. Most monographs written before 1990 were largely 
optimistic about the government and the course of action it was taking. In the 
first ten years of independence, a number of publications were written from the 
perspective of Zanu (PF) regarding the country’s development. Herbert 
Ushewokunze, Canaan Banana, Fay Chung and Arthur Patsanza amongst 
others, were keen to emphasise the worst effects of Zimbabwe’s colonial 
legacy, whilst simultaneously asserting and emphasising the socialist ideals of 
the new regime.10 Indeed in the early 1980s many writers were keen to both 
examine and explain Zanu (PF)’s adoption of socialism and further examine 
how scientific socialism would be implemented within the country. Fay Chung 
and Emmanuel Ngara, for example, stressed that Zimbabwean socialism 
“rejects all forms of exploitation, whether it be the exploitation of producers by 
the owners of capital, or the oppression of subject peoples by their rulers”.11 
However, in subsequent passages the writers also noted that in the Zimbabwean 
context that “what socialism advocates… is not absolute equality but equal 
opportunity”.12 Furthermore, that “Marxist-Leninism is not a dogma but a 
guide to action which much be harmonized with our own historical, cultural 
and social circumstances”.13 Consequently, in line with a broader continent-
wide tradition, Zanu-PF’s socialism was interpreted to be context specific, even 
as it tracked African post-colonial notions of socialism defined in development 
terms.  
 
Christine Sylvester, while approaching the subject from a different perspective 
than the aforementioned authors, also suggests that in this period Zanu (PF) 
were “setting forth a revolutionary and action platform premised on 
                                               
10
 Herbert Ushewokunze, An Agenda for Zimbabwe (Harare: College Press Publishers, 1990); 
Canaan Banana, ed., Turmoil and Tenacity Zimbabwe 1890-1990 (Harare: College Press. 
1989); Fay Chung, “Education: Revolution or Reform,” in Colin Stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe’s 
Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa (London: Macmillan, 
1988), 118-133; Arthur Patsanza, Our Zimbabwe - An Element of Political Economy (Harare: 
Govazvimwe Mukuruwenzira Publishers, 1988). 
11
 Fay Chung and Emmanuel Ngara, Socialism, Education and Development: A Challenge to 
Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), 5. 
12
 Chung and Ngara, 5. 
13
 Chung and Ngara, 12. 
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socialism”.14 Indeed, even writers such as Jeffrey Herbst and Tor Skalnes who 
subsequently argue that Zimbabwe had abandoned socialism by 1990, at least 
acknowledge moves towards socialism in the preceding decade.15  
 
However, as early as 1983, Andre Astrow was suggesting that Zanu (PF) was 
entirely lacking in socialist credentials.16 He argued that after independence, 
the new ‘petty bourgeois’ leadership misdirected the socialism of the liberation 
struggle, creating affluence for themselves at the expense of the working 
classes. As such, the promise of the revolution lay with the working classes 
who could not fulfil their role because of the policies the government were 
pursuing. According to Astrow, the government’s decision to plan on the basis 
of stabilising capitalism meant that the country would never experience a 
socialist transformation. While Astrow’s overall conclusion may seem 
strikingly accurate with the benefit of hindsight, his attempt to read off political 
practice from class position was too deterministic for some tastes. 
 
The second phase of the historiography, generally written after 1990, was to a 
large extent dominated by a sense of disenchantment with the government. 
Jenkins and Knight,17 like Raftopoulos and Savage,18 although writing from 
very different perspectives, discuss the associated problems Zimbabwe faced 
because of limited societal transformation. In their analysis, Jenkins and Knight 
argue that the policy of reconciliation employed by the government was in the 
main a rhetorical device, as after independence Zimbabwe experienced limited 
structural changes. Furthermore, while Zanu (PF) may have felt constrained 
because of fears of ‘White Flight’, South Africa’s destabilisation campaign and 
the Lancaster House agreement, Jenkins and Knight argue that it was the 
government’s own policies which hindered the transition to socialism. In doing 
so, they suggest that the regime’s concentration on micro rather than 
macroeconomics through the policy of ‘growth with equity’ was inherently 
flawed. Raftopoulos and Savage, in their edited collection, attempted to 
reconcile the increasingly authoritarian nature of Zimbabwe since 2000 with 
the image of the country as a “beacon of hope at the time of independence”.19 
They also assess the ambiguous implications of the policy of reconciliation, 
and in doing so highlight the contradictory position whereby Zanu (PF) was 
actually emphasising “the centrality of race in Zimbabwe’s history”.20 Hevina 
                                               
14
 Sylvester, 68. 
15
 Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 1990); 
Tor Skalnes, The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe - continuity and change in 
development (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995). 
16
 Andre Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost its Way? (London: Zed, 1983). 
17
 Carolyn Jenkins and John Knight, The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe - Neither Growth 
Nor Equity (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
18
 Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, eds., Zimbabwe Injustice and Political 
Reconciliation (Cape Town: Rondebosch: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004). 
19
 Raftopoulos and Savage, v. 
20
 Raftopoulos and Savage, xx. 
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Dashwood, by contrast, argues that the key to understanding the current 
political situation in Zimbabwe requires a thorough analysis of its class 
position.21 For Dashwood, the key development after independence was “the 
embourgeoisement of the ruling elite… [which led to the] embracing of a 
capitalist ideology”,22 and largely contributed to the deviation and 
abandonment of the large scale welfare initiatives instigated in the early 
1980s.23 
 
When assessing the historiography, it is clear that there has been a significant 
shift in the perspectives concerning the first five or so years of independent 
Zimbabwe. While the arguments outlined above are not exhaustive, they do 
reflect the broader historiographical trends which were dominant for this 
period. Interpretations have moved from broadly positive and supportive of 
Mugabe and Zanu (PF) to exclusively negative and condemnatory of the 
regime in Harare. It is this swing of the historiographical pendulum that 
arguably has gone too far.  
 
In order to assess the socialist nature of Zimbabwe in the early 1980s it is 
useful to re-examine the party’s adoption of socialism alongside an appraisal of 
governmental initiatives in the early part of the decade. It must be remembered 
that Zanu (PF)’s adoption of the two stage theory of democratic revolution 
indicated that change would be gradual; indeed, the party itself accepted that 
“the mere adoption of socialism as an ideology does not mean automatic 
success”.24 While the first stage of the revolution incorporated the overthrow of 
the Smith regime with the attainment of independence, the second phase was 
problematic and ambiguous, as the implication was that the achievement of 
independence was only the first step to true liberation. However, a closer 
examination of the government’s attempts in the early 1980s to reform the 
education, healthcare and labour sectors shows that they had arguably 
embarked on a course which was heading towards the fulfilment of the theory 
and the de facto transition to socialism; even if taken to be welfare reformism 
and development in this early stage.  For this period the main published 
primary sources are newspapers such as The Herald, alongside various 
government supported periodicals. As the thirty year rule is still in force at the 
National Archives of Zimbabwe, this means that there are no other available 
sources in the public sphere. Consequently, this article draws on some of the 
limited primary material that is available. 
 
                                               
21
 Hevina Dashwood, Zimbabwe, The Political Economy of Transformation (Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
22
 Dashwood, 3-4. 
23
 See also Staffan Darnolf and Liisa Laasko, eds., Twenty Years of Independence in 
Zimbabwe From Liberation to Authoritarianism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
particularly the article by Brian Raftopoulos and Daniel Compagnon, Indigenization, the State 
Bourgeoisie and Neo-authoritarian Politics, 15-34. 
24
 Chung and Ngara, 37-38. 
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In 1979 there were 819,586 children in 2,401 primary schools, an average of 
341 children per school.25 As a result one of the government’s main priorities 
was to democratise access to education, as it was felt that a heavy emphasis on 
education was “the main tool for developing…Zimbabwe’s future”.26 
Governmental policy was that of “education with production” with an 
emphasis, according to Zvongo, on “producing a politically conscious nation, 
aware of and devoted to the promotion of the welfare state”.27 By 1982 the 
number of children in primary school rose to 1,903,917, a 132% increase, with 
the number of primary schools virtually doubling to 4,012; an impressive 
growth rate over a three year period.28 A particular success in this period was 
the number of children entering secondary schooling,29 something that 
according to the government demonstrated that “education is now readily 
accessible to all people, particularly at primary and junior secondary school 
level”.30 Furthermore, in 1983, Zimbabwe’s national literacy campaign was 
launched, which emphasised the importance of adult education. The 
government also decided that new educational methods were to be employed, 
as the rote learning favoured in Rhodesia was abolished in favour of an 
increased emphasis on scientific and technological education. Therefore in the 
education sector it seems that the promotion of socialism as a force ‘which 
guarantees all round development... in the interests of society’,31 was a key 
concern for the government as Zimbabwe’s youth were particularly targeted. 
As Zanu (PF) had adopted the two stage theory of democratic revolution, in the 
early 1980s they were so far fulfilling their role in this, in as much as access to 
education became much broader based.   
 
Once in power, Zanu (PF) attempted to redress the inequality of and access to 
healthcare, as according to Loewenson and Sanders, “the challenge at 
independence lay in reorganising a deliberately fragmented, inaccessible and 
oppressive form of healthcare, into one which would serve the needs of all and 
respond to changing social and economic demands”.32 The official 
governmental policy was that of “planning with equity”, which emphasised the 
need for a fully integrated health service which benefited the previously 
marginalised members of the population. The government also realised the 
                                               
25
 The Ministry of Education and Culture, “Education: the road to Zimbabwe’s future,” The 
Herald, 17 April 1982: 12. 
26
 The Ministry of Education and Culture, 12. 
27
 Rungano Zvobgo, “Education and the Challenge of Independence,” In Ibbo Mandaza, ed., 
Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar: Codesria book series, 
1986), 334. 
28
 The Ministry of Education and Culture, 12. 
29
 The number of children entering secondary education increased from 66,215 in 1979 to 
218,430 in 1982; The Ministry of Education and Culture, 12   
30
 The Ministry of Education and Culture, 12   
31
 E. Krustkaln, “Socialism, the way forward,” The Herald, 6 September 1984: 4. 
32
 Rene Loewenson and David Sanders, “The Political Economy of Health and Nutrition,” in 
Colin Stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe’s Prospects: Issues of Race, Class and Capital in Southern 
Africa (London: Macmillan, 1988), 137. 
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need to “move away from the inappropriate hospital based curative system [to 
develop a] system that is relevant to our circumstances”.33 Consequently, in 
1981 the government launched the village health worker programme, an 
attempt to bring healthcare within reach of those in the most remote areas. 
Village health workers were trained “to provide basic health education and 
health care for their communities”,34 with an emphasis placed on problem 
solving within the community. In 1982 a diarrhoeal disease programme was 
implemented, as diarrhoea-related deaths were identified as a key priority. 
These initiatives fitted in with a wider pattern of extensive childhood 
immunization and a drive towards improved sanitation. Additionally, by 1985 
Zimbabwe had the highest use of contraception in sub-Saharan Africa, 
demonstrating an emphasis on education within healthcare.   
 
Zanu (PF) identified its third welfare priority as that of labour reform. For 
much of the colonial era there was no legally recognised African representation 
in the workplace because of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which 
excluded Africans from the term ‘employee’. While there had been some 
limited reforms in the 1950s, there was little sense of equality on the factory 
floor, with women often facing the most stringent forms of discrimination. 
Consequently, the labour system needed to be completely reworked. According 
to Sachikonye, “the advent of independence… assumed added significance to 
the workers”,35 and gave hope to a workforce who believed independence 
would positively alter their circumstances. Perhaps the most significant piece of 
legislation to be passed in the early 1980s was the 1985 Labour Relations Act 
(LRA). Far reaching in its objectives, but primarily concerned with introducing 
a comprehensive list of employment regulations, in doing so it built upon 
previous labour legislation, and defined the “fundamental rights of workers and 
unfair labour practices”.36 Furthermore, “the passage of the LRA represented a 
major advance for the working class to the degree that its fundamental rights 
have been formally specified and guaranteed”.37 Also in this period the second 
major achievement of the government was the founding of the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions,38 alongside the establishment of a national 
minimum wage, and the introduction of maternity leave. Consequently, as the 
second stage of the two stage theory argues that socialism is only achievable 
once the national democratic stage has been carried through, this in turn 
suggests that a period of transition from capitalism to socialism is seen as 
necessary. Arguably, Zanu (PF) was on its way to fulfilling the promises of the 
                                               
33
 The Ministry of Health. “Health for all is the government’s target,” The Herald, 17 April 
1982: 16.  
34
 The Ministry of Health, 16.  
35
 Lloyd Sachikonye, “State, Capital and Trade Union,”in Ibbo Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: The 
Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar: Codesria book series, 1986), 252.  
36
 Sachikonye, 260. 
37
 Sachikonye, 263. 
38
 For an example of the increased importance placed on Zimbabwe’s industry see Kumbirai 
Kangai, “New Laws give workers a better life,” The Herald, 17 April 1982: 6. 
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revolution, as the democratisation of social resources such as access to 
education and healthcare were prioritised, alongside the implementation of 
labour reforms. 
 
However, in this same period, it also appears that Zimbabwe’s commitment to 
socialism was tempered by the desire to stabilise the economy through the 
continuation of capitalist production and markets. What precisely were the 
factors which hindered the larger scale implementation of socialism? While 
historians disagree over the precise inhibiting effects of the Lancaster House 
constitutional agreement, it is widely acknowledged that its provisions did have 
an impact on the new government. Jenkins and Knight believe that “for the first 
decade after attaining independence Zimbabwe’s new government was 
constrained in implementing a full socialist programme by the constitution to 
which it had agreed in 1979”.39 Indeed, in September 1979 Zanu (PF) had 
anticipated that the Lancaster House conference would pose a serious threat to 
the revolution,40 as land could only be sold on a ‘willing buyer, willing seller 
basis’, and furthermore that the tiny white minority had one fifth of the seats in 
parliament reserved for it. Both constraints had huge implications for a country 
which was supposed to be rapidly transforming in the interests of the black 
majority.41 As Mugabe was keen to encourage the white population to remain 
in Zimbabwe, this meant that radical land distribution was necessarily put on 
hold, being deferred for at least ten years until the Lancaster House agreement 
expired. Furthermore, according to Palmer, “the issue of land reform [was] so 
high on the political agenda a decade ago, but… a curious silence fell for much 
of the 1980s”.42  While from 1980-1985, 2,298,241 hectares of land had been 
purchased by the government, many commentators insisted that this 
reappropriation was not substantial enough.43 The silence identified by Palmer 
was explained by Moyo in his assertion that “what seems clear, given the 
interest of the ‘West’ in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s ‘land question’, is that 
there is growing international consensus and local acceptance that there may 
really be no ‘land question’ worth talking about in 1986, given Zimbabwe’s 
star agricultural performance”.44 Factors such as these, according to the 
government, had “greatly retarded the resettlement programme”.45 
                                               
39
 Jenkins and Knight, 25. 
40
 For an example of this type of literature, see the Zimbabwe News, especially vol. 11 no. 3, 
September-October 1979. 
41
 In this period, Robert Mugabe was advised by both Samora Machel (President of 
Mozambique) and Julius Nyerere (President of Tanzania) about the disabling effects which a 
radical restructuring of the economy can bring in terms of “White Flight”. Consequently, it is 
widely believed that this advice was a driving factor for the post-Independence policy of 
“reconciliation” employed by Zanu (PF). 
42
 Robin Palmer, “Land Reform in Zimbabwe 1980-1990,” African Affairs 355 (April 1990): 
163. 
43
 Quoted in Parade (October 1989), p. 9, cited in Robin Palmer, 170.  
44
 Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” in Ibbo Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: The Political 
Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar: Codesria book series, 1986), 165. 
45
 “Land to the People,” Zimbabwe News 17, no. 3 (March 1986): 25. 
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Consequently when “during the political struggle… Zanu… [had]  committed 
themselves to radical land reform on achieving power”,46 the government’s 
inability to fulfil their promise did little to bolster their socialist credentials.   
 
Another factor which is widely thought to have hindered Zimbabwe’s transition 
to socialism was South Africa’s campaign of ‘destabilisation’. Apart from the 
historic ties between South Africa and Rhodesia, South African capital was as 
influential in Zimbabwe as it had been in Rhodesia, with South Africa being 
the economic powerhouse of the region.47 As described by Martin and Johnson, 
South Africa’s destabilisation campaign “can be subdivided into seven 
categories – direct military action including sabotage, clandestine support for 
banditry, assassination, espionage, economic sabotage propaganda and 
disinformation”.48 Perhaps most importantly, “Zimbabwe’s…ties to South 
Africa, including the fact that it inherited Pretoria as its largest trading partner 
at independence, left it particularly vulnerable to economic destabilisation”.49 
Furthermore, according to Sylvester, “soon after Mugabe took office, South 
Africa began to impose sanctions against its neighbour, abrogating a long-
standing bilateral trade agreement… disallowing Zimbabwean migrant labour 
and deporting forty thousand mine workers”.50 Consequently it seems clear that 
South Africa’s campaign of destabilisation limited the room for manoeuvre 
enjoyed by the Mugabe government in the early 1980s. While this paper does 
not attempt to exculpate the actions of Zanu (PF), it seems entirely reasonable 
to suggest that Mugabe and the party tempered their socialist outlook because 
of fears of destabilisation. It appears as though Samora Machel’s observation 
that “there are two things you cannot choose, neighbours and brothers”,51 had 
for Zimbabwe never been more apt.   
 
While “during the 1980s the new government felt constrained in its ability to 
engage in too radical a redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks”,52 and 
factors such as destabilisation may have tempered the government’s socialism, 
it appears that by the middle of the 1980s Zanu (PF)’s earlier welfare initiatives 
were not sustainable. Although many scholars see the “signs of stagnation and 
                                               
46
 Palmer, 165. 
47
 According to Carol Thompson, ‘South African investment in Rhodesia was estimated at US 
$330 million for 1976 and $1.03 billion in 1979’, Carol B. Thompson, Challenge to 
Imperialism – The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House, 1985), 154. 
48
 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, “Zimbabwe: ‘Apartheid’s Dilemma,’” in Phyllis 
Johnson and David Martin, eds., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Harare: 
Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern African Research Documentation Centre, 
1986), 43. 
49
 Martin and Johnson, 67. 
50
 Sylvester, 77. 
51
 Martin and Johnson, 46. 
52
 Jenkins and Knight, 30. 
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maybe even a reversal of the trend”,53 as evidence that Zanu (PF) were not 
interested in implementing a socialist agenda, it could also be argued that it was 
the demands of the market and particularly the drought of 1982/3, that caused 
Zanu (PF) to turn their attentions elsewhere. Indeed according to Agere, “the 
fundamental problem…is that [welfare systems are] influenced by the demands 
of capital”.54 This suggestion gives further weight to the suggestion that Zanu 
(PF) were inhibited in implementing a fully socialist agenda because of a 
variety of external factors. 
 
This article has so far proposed that in the early 1980s, Zanu (PF) were taking 
tentative steps to democratise and ultimately socialise the country, but were 
also inhibited by market forces. However, by the mid-1980s, the defining 
moment of Gukurahundi would suggest that this position had been overlaid by 
a ruthless authoritarianism. The origins and the consequences of the massacres 
in western Zimbabwe are a hugely complex topic;55 suffice to say the Fifth 
Brigade who were responsible for Gukurahundi were Mugabe’s self-styled 
personal militia, and were created with the intention to ‘plough’ and 
‘reconstruct’ Zimbabwe. In doing so, they introduced a “qualitatively new and 
more horrific kind of war”.56 Arguably perpetrating genocide in their actions to 
eliminate Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu stronghold, the Fifth Brigade’s attacks were 
directed towards civilians, political opponents and civil servants, suggesting 
that this was an exercise in ‘total warfare’. Beatings, rape and torture were the 
key weapons employed by Mugabe’s personal army, alongside stringent 
curfews. Public executions were commonplace, with victims being forced to 
dig their own graves before they were shot. Consequently “Five Brigade were 
destined to become the most controversial army unit ever formed in 
Zimbabwe”.57 
 
The employment of the Fifth Brigade was an attempt by Mugabe to eliminate 
opposition and consolidate his power, a characteristic much in evidence in the 
subsequent 1985 election.  During this period, reports of ‘terror and abduction’ 
                                               
53
 Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (London: 
Pinter, 1989), 174. 
54
 Samuel Takarina-Agere, “Progress and Problems in the Healthcare Delivery System,” in 
Ibbo Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar: 
Codesria book series, 1986), 374. 
55
 See for instance, Ian Phimister, “The making and meanings of the massacres in 
Matabeleland,” Development Dialogue 50 (December 2008): 197-214; Shari Eppel, 
“‘Gukurahundi’ The need for truth and reparation,” in Brian Raftopoulous and Tyrone 
Savage, eds., Zimbabwe Injustice and Political Reconciliation (Cape Town: Rondebosch: 
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were commonplace,58 with Zanu-Zapu rivalry reaching its peak. Despite the 
government slogan of “Your vote is your secret”, it is clear that they did all 
they could to reinforce their dominance, using whatever means necessary. 
Polling stations were strategically placed to benefit Zanu (PF), and the process 
of registering people as members of the electorate was deliberately difficult and 
time consuming. The result of the election signalled further consolidation of 
Zanu (PF)’s power, with the party winning 64 seats (80% of the vote). The 
election was characterised by a strong anti-Nkomo sentiment, and after the 
election mock funerals were carried out for Zapu and Nkomo; “at one such 
funeral in Kadoma, a live bull (the Zapu election symbol) was actually axed to 
death in front of a huge crowd to symbolise the death of Zapu”.59 By 1985, it 
was becoming even clearer that Zanu (PF)’s democratic socialist doctrine had 
given way to authoritarianism, and that this imperative was clearly in the 
ascendant.   
 
Perhaps one way of beginning to understand the apparent ‘failure of the 
revolution’ and subsequent unsuccessful transition to socialism is to briefly re-
examine the position of both Zanu (PF) and Zapu in the latter stages of the 
liberation struggle. While both parties were brought together under the Patriotic 
Front coalition and had the shared objective of bringing down the Smith 
regime, the earlier 1963 split and the formation of Zanu had profoundly altered 
the nature of the liberation struggle. While according to John Saul, Zanu 
distinguished themselves from Zapu in terms of an early commitment to armed 
struggle, he sees that the 1963 split was actually precipitated by “a 
confrontation between a faction of educated, middle class, rather elitist 
elements who had joined the nationalist movement in the early sixties… and 
those who had much firmer roots among the migrant workers and the peasantry 
itself”.60 It was the former faction which would breakaway from Zapu to form 
Zanu, while the latter group remained under Nkomo’s leadership. Consequently 
the disparate class position of the liberation leaders proved decisive in shaping 
the rhetoric of both Zapu and Zanu during the ‘Second Chimurenga’ and after 
the latter assumed office in 1980.  
 
Yet even this perspective may overemphasize the differences between Zapu 
and Zanu. Ranger, for example, claimed that “Robert Mugabe offered no 
prospect of the man who might start from scratch. He was one of the ‘old 
guard’ leadership”.61 Accordingly it was this clash between the ‘old guard’, and 
those who had embraced the imperatives of guerrilla struggle who sought to 
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radicalise the party once Zanu assumed power. While Zanu (PF) may have 
appeared to be radicalised in the ending stages of the liberation struggle, this 
was certainly a contingent process. Transformation was far from complete, and 
turned on authoritarian principles which rewarded unwavering loyalty to the 
‘old guard’. When the policies or legitimacy of this group were questioned, 
Mugabe and his closest political allies were well positioned to question the 
loyalty of these ‘dissenting’ factions, which ultimately resulted in the further 
purging of the leftist elements of the party. Once in power, the authoritarian 
elements of the party gradually trumped the more progressive and socialist 
elements of the party. While initially the “ideological struggles experienced by 
the intellectuals on the road to power were acute and did have transformative 
potential for the whole of Zimbabwe”;62 this struggle was not allowed to play 
out and instead one party statism and authoritarianism triumphed.  
 
While at first glance, it is tempting to accept the arguments of scholars such as 
Andre Astrow, and simply dismiss Zanu (PF)’s claim that the country was 
following scientific socialism, on closer inspection it appears that there were 
‘episodes of ambiguity’ when it appeared that the country was edging towards 
a socialist transformation. But while the government’s choice of following the 
two stage theory of democratic revolution appeared to reaffirm their connection 
with socialism, in the event even this limited goal was missed. Socialist and 
even welfare targets were not met, as democratisation itself also faltered; 
indeed by this period the party’s model of socialism was not strong on either 
democracy or accountability. By the mid-1980s, it was increasingly clear that 
the reforms that had been instigated were not sustainable because of a lack of 
available funding. If Zanu (PF) had little room for dramatic economic 
manoeuvre, constrained as the party was by a variety of external factors, 
ultimately it seems that the promotion of western investment was the 
government’s key concern. Davies may well be correct when asserting that a 
“period of transition from capitalism to socialism will be characterised by 
ambiguity and that this ambiguity will be heightened when the transition is 
attempted”.63 
 
This article has suggested that at independence in 1980, the potential possibility 
did exist for a socialist transformation that would have allowed Zimbabwe to 
undergo profound change. Yet by 1985 it seemed that the transition to 
socialism was no transition at all. Instead, Zanu (PF) had consolidated itself as 
the dominant force in Zimbabwean politics, and the ‘leftist’ elements of the 
party had been silenced. Nonetheless, before that point was reached, the 
government did for a period, and on some levels, engage with socialism on 
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more than just an entirely rhetorical level. While today’s historiographical 
wisdom largely holds that socialism was never a realistic prospect in 
Zimbabwe, living and dying as mere rhetoric, this article has argued that 
‘episodes of ambiguity’ were clearly discernable. A close inspection of the 
early 1980s reveals the hope of a better life encompassed within the liberation 
struggle and the possibility of a socialist future, even if it also included the 
ruthless authoritarian nature of the regime, coupled with Mugabe’s 
determination to stamp out all opposition to the new order of things. Sadly, it 
was the latter characteristics that have triumphed and have become 
Zimbabwe’s tragedy. 
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